Super savings by Jim Minifie
Super  savings
Jim Minifie
April 2015
Super savings 
Grattan Institute 2015  
Grattan Institute Support         Grattan Institute Report No. 2015-1, April 2015 
This report was written by Jim Minifie, Grattan Institute Productivity Growth 
Program Director. Tim Cameron and Jim Savage provided extensive research 
assistance and made substantial contributions to the report. Gabriela D’Souza 
and Tristan Barlow also made significant contributions. James Button assisted in 
its preparation. 
We would like to thank the members of Grattan Institute’s Productivity Growth 
Reference Group and industry experts, researchers and officials for their 
extensive input on drafts.  
The opinions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the views of Grattan Institute’s founding members, affiliates, individual 
board members or reference group members. Any remaining errors or omissions 
are the responsibility of the authors. 
Grattan Institute is an independent think-tank focused on Australian public policy. 
Our work is independent, practical and rigorous. We aim to improve policy 
outcomes by engaging with both decision-makers and the community. 
For further information on the Institute’s programs, or to join our mailing list, 
please go to: http://www.grattan.edu.au/ 
This report may be cited as: 
Minifie, J., Cameron, T., and Savage, J. 2015, Super savings, Grattan Institute 
ISBN 978-1-925015-66-9 
All material published or otherwise created by Grattan Institute is licensed under a Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License  
Google
Origin Foundation
EY
PwC
The Scanlon Foundation
Wesfarmers
Ashurst
Deloitte
Jacobs
Mercy Health
Urbis
Westpac
Founding Members Program Support
Affiliate Partners
Senior Affiliates
Affiliates
Higher Education Program
Super savings 
Grattan Institute 2015  
Overview 
Grattan Institute’s 2014 report, Super Sting, found that Australians 
are paying far too much for superannuation. We pay about $21 
billion a year in fees. That report proposed that government 
reduce fees by running a tender to select funds to operate the 
default accounts used by most working Australians.  
The Murray Financial System Inquiry came to similar conclusions 
to those in Super Sting. Its 2014 report finds there is not strong 
competition based on fees in the superannuation sector. It 
recommends a “competitive mechanism”, or tender, to select 
default products, unless a review held by 2020 shows the sector 
has become much more efficient. 
This report analyses superannuation fees and costs in depth. It 
shows that there are excess costs in both administration and 
investment management. It evaluates recent policy initiatives to 
lower fees and recommends further reforms. 
Our new analysis confirms the conclusions of our previous report. 
In both default and choice funds, administration fees are too high, 
and take a toll on net returns. There is little evidence that funds 
that charge higher fees provide better member services. There 
are too many accounts, too many funds, and too many of them 
incur high administrative costs. We pay $4 billion a year above 
what would be charged by lean funds.  
Investment fees are also too high. Many funds do not deliver 
returns that justify their fees. Cutting fees to what high-performing, 
lean funds charge could save more than $2 billion a year. 
In sum, superannuation could be run for much less than the $16 
billion currently charged by large funds (self-managed super costs 
another $5 billion).  
The superannuation industry argues that its $21 billion costs are 
not excessive, and will fall over time. It opposes a tender for 
default accounts based on fees, claiming that it would reduce 
investment quality and net returns. 
But current initiatives to reduce costs are not enough. The 
Stronger Super reforms to reduce administration costs and make 
default products transparent will cut total default fees by about $1 
billion. The Future of Financial Advice reforms could yield benefits 
for choice account holders. But even if regulators pursue these 
initiatives with zeal, they will leave billions on the table.  
If remaining excess costs are not removed, they will drain well 
over 5 per cent – or $40,000 – out of the average default account 
holder’s fund by retirement. Excess costs in choice 
superannuation are even larger. 
Government must act to close accounts, merge funds and run a 
tender to select default products. The tender would save account 
holders a further $1 billion a year, and create a benchmark to 
force other funds to lift their game. A high performing 
superannuation system will take the pressure off taxpayers and 
give Australians greater confidence in their retirement. 
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1. What superannuation is and why it matters
Superannuation is a compulsory private saving system that has 
become a large part of Australia’s financial landscape since its 
introduction as a national system in 1992. The system holds $1.9 
trillion in assets.1  Australians pay about $16 billion a year in fees 
to collective funds to manage their superannuation, or more than 
$1000 per person. Self-managed funds cost about $5 billion more. 
1.1 Contributions and tax treatment 
Employers must contribute a proportion of each employee’s wage 
to the employee’s superannuation account. 2 The contribution 
rate, which started at 3 per cent of a wage or salary in 1992, is 9.5 
per cent today, and is legislated to rise to 12 per cent by 2025.3  
Individuals can make additional contributions to superannuation if 
they wish. Australians under 49 can put up to $30,000 a year from 
their pre-tax wages into their superannuation accounts and only 
pay 15 per cent tax on these contributions, while those older than 
49 can contribute $35,000 a year. For many people, the 15 per 
cent tax rate on superannuation contributions is lower than if they 
saved the money outside superannuation. People can also make 
additional contributions from post-tax income. In 2013, employers 
paid $77 billion and individuals $36 billion into superannuation.4  
                                            
1 APRA (2014m). 
2 The requirement does not apply to employees earning less than $450 / month.  
3 'Minerals Resource Rent Tax Repeal and Other Measures Act 2014 (Cth) 
Schedule 6'. 
4 APRA (2014a). 
Earnings on superannuation accounts are also taxed at what is a 
preferential rate for many people. Earnings are not taxed at 
marginal income tax rates but are taxed at a flat rate of 15 per 
cent until the account holder moves into pension phase (typically 
at age 60).5 Once in that phase he or she pays no tax on the 
earnings of a superannuation account.6 
1.2 Default and choice superannuation 
Since 2005, most Australians have been able to choose their 
superannuation fund. A worker who does not actively choose a 
fund is allocated to a default product nominated either by his or 
her employer or specified in an industrial agreement. 
Superannuation funds manage about $468 billion in default 
accounts, about a quarter of all superannuation assets.7 About 10 
million people are in default superannuation, with about 18 million 
accounts in total. The average balance in default superannuation 
is currently about $25,000 per account and about $45,000 per 
person. Average default balances will grow strongly over coming 
decades, reflecting the high and growing contribution rates.   
                                                                                     
 
5 Capital gains are also taxed at a concessional rate.  
6 Many argue that these tax concessions should be better targeted, but that 
issue is beyond the scope of this report: see e.g. Daley, et al. (2014), p.32-36; 
Financial System Inquiry (2014) pg 90; Treasury (2015); Fraser (2015) 
7 APRA (2014m). 
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All new default superannuation accounts must now be in a 
MySuper product. They are meant to be simpler and more 
comparable than previous default products. MySuper products 
must be invested in a diverse spread of assets. The types of fees 
that can be charged are limited and commissions cannot be paid.  
The term choice is used to describe superannuation accounts 
other than defaults. The $1.5 trillion in assets managed in the 
choice segment are split between self-managed superannuation 
funds (SMSFs) and “large funds” of more than four members. The 
first group holds about $570 billion, the second about $930 
billion.8 We estimate that the average balance in the choice 
segment (excluding SMSFs) is about $110,000 per account, and 
about $160,000 per person, reflecting higher balances than 
default superannuation during the accumulation phase and a 
greater share of pension phase accounts. There are about 1 
million people in half a million SMSFs, with average holdings per 
person of about $570,000. 
1.3 Fund types 
The 277 large superannuation funds (defined as funds with at 
least four members) hold $1.3 trillion of assets. Of these, about 
150 manage more than $50 million.9 These funds manage about 
30 million accounts for about 15 million people.10 In addition, a 
million Australians have superannuation in SMSFs. 
                                            
8 Ibid.. 
9 APRA statistics changed in September 2013 to include funds with less than 
$50 million in assets.  
10 APRA (2014a). 
Most superannuation funds are regulated by government 
agencies. The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 
regulates most of the 277 large funds. The Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) regulates SMSFs.  
APRA categorises large superannuation funds as industry, retail, 
corporate or public sector funds. Industry, corporate and public 
sector funds are typically run on a not-for-profit basis while retail 
funds are for-profit entities. Key differences among them include: 
• Industry funds have historically “provided for employees 
working in the same industry or group of related industries.” 
This distinction is less relevant today, but industry funds 
continue to manage the majority of default accounts.  
• Retail funds offer superannuation products to the public. They 
have about 20 per cent of the default market in their own right. 
Australia’s commercial banks and financial services company 
AMP operate the largest retail funds.  
• Corporate funds exist “for the benefit of employees of a 
particular entity or a group of related entities, with joint 
member and employer control”.11 The fund often outsources 
all functions to a third party, typically a retail fund.  
• Public sector funds are open only to government employees.  
                                            
11 Ibid.. 
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1.4 How funds invest: asset classes and investment styles  
Funds invest in a wide range of assets in Australia and overseas. 
About 80 per cent of the $1.3 trillion managed by collective 
superannuation funds – that is, excluding self-managed funds – is 
invested in listed assets or other assets such as cash or 
government bonds that are easy to buy and sell at short notice. 
The remaining 20 per cent is invested in less liquid assets such as 
property or infrastructure.  
Funds offer account holders a range of multi-sector investment 
products. The products are typically invested across a number of 
asset classes in search of a balance between expected returns 
and risk.  
Account holders can choose to allocate their wealth across a 
number of products. For example, they may retain some funds in 
a multi-sector product, and also hold one or more single-sector 
products. Account holders who do not explicitly make a choice are 
allocated to a default multi-sector product.  
Fund trustees develop a multi-sector product by deciding how to 
invest across different assets. They also select investment 
managers, and they review their asset allocation and manager 
selection periodically, often with input from advisers known as 
asset consultants, with the goal of ensuring that the portfolio 
meets return and risk goals.  
In turn, asset managers are responsible for delivering on the 
mandate agreed with the superannuation fund. They seek to 
achieve agreed risk and return goals, subject to agreed 
constraints such as what asset classes to invest in and how active 
to be in managing those investments. They will typically decide 
which individual stocks or bonds to hold and may retain some 
discretion to switch between asset classes.  
In listed asset classes, managers may opt to be active – in other 
words, to retain discretion and exercise judgement about how to 
invest – or passive: that is, apply pre-set rules to define which 
assets to hold. Active styles are usually more expensive than 
passive styles. An example of a passive investment style is a 
capitalisation-weighted index fund. It buys and holds equities 
according to their market capitalisation. There are also hybrids of 
passive and active investment styles. 
1.5 An efficient system helps account holders and 
taxpayers 
Australians have a right to expect the best possible returns from 
their superannuation. For many, accumulated super savings will 
be a major source of income in retirement, so the better their 
returns, the easier their retirement. High net returns can also help 
government to reduce future pension payments and taxes. 
Our 2014 report, Super Sting, shows that the Australian 
superannuation industry’s high average fees have a large, 
negative impact on returns. The precise impact depends on 
returns and income growth, but fees can make the difference 
between steak and spaghetti in retirement. An apparently modest 
fee of one per cent every year over a working life — lower than 
the average Australian fee — can be expected to reduce 
retirement income by more than 20 per cent. 
An efficient superannuation system should provide good 
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investment returns and appropriate member services at low cost. 
If the system were efficient, then reducing costs would impair 
member services or even reduce net investment returns after 
fees. By contrast, in an inefficient system such as Australia’s, 
costs can be cut without impairing member services or net 
returns. Inefficiency can be caused by wasted costs in 
administration or in investment management, or both.  
1.6 What this report does 
This report examines how to cut waste in the Australian 
superannuation system.  
Chapter Two assesses superannuation administration, and 
estimates how much leaner administration could save. 
Chapter Three examines superannuation investment 
management. It reviews how fees affect net performance. It 
examines how investment managers perform against benchmarks 
and each other. It estimates how much leaner investment 
management could save. 
Chapter Four, reproduced from our 2014 report Super Sting, 
explains why fees are high in superannuation. 
Chapter Five evaluates whether current policy initiatives over the 
next few years will cut costs, and by how much.  
Chapter Six shows how further reforms could cut much more 
waste from our superannuation system. 
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2. Average administration fees are too high  
This chapter examines the administration of superannuation – that 
is, all of the activities that a superannuation fund undertakes with 
the exception of investment management. In 2014 Australians 
paid collective superannuation funds (that is, all funds apart from 
SMSFs) $5.9 billion – $570 per person on average – to administer 
their accounts.  
Default and choice fund administration fees are both about 0.45 
per cent a year of average account balances. Members of choice 
accounts pay about $800 a year on average (Figure 1). Average 
account sizes are about $110,000 and people have 1.6 accounts 
on average.  
Default fees are currently much lower in dollar terms. Accounts 
are about $25,000 on average, and average fees on an account 
that size are about $115. The average person with a default 
account has just under two accounts, so administration fees are 
about $212 per default member.  
Administration fees in choice and default superannuation are 
higher than they need to be for three main reasons. First, about 
12 million superannuation accounts are not needed. Second, 
there are still too many funds. Third, many people are in funds 
that are inefficient or provide low-value services. 
Figure 1: Administration fees are over $200 per person in default 
superannuation and almost $800 in choice 
Dollars per representative member  
 
Notes: Assumes the average number of accounts per person in that segment (1.85 in 
default, 1.6 in choice).  
Sources: Grattan analysis. 
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2.1 High administration fees reduce retirement incomes 
High administration fees reduce retirement balances in both 
choice and default superannuation. 
The median administration fee paid on a single default account is 
only a little higher than $100 today because the average account 
balance is small. But fees grow over time: many products levy 
administration fees as a percentage of assets under 
management, so the average dollar fee will increase as the 
system matures and account balances increase. Even the median 
administration fee is big enough to reduce retirement balances by 
more than $40,000 over a lifetime (Figure 2). The variable fee 
cuts retirement balances much more than the fixed fee, as Figure 
2 shows.  
Administration expenses per account have risen steadily since 
2005 despite steady fund consolidation. Funds of all sizes now 
report much higher administration costs than they did in 2005. For 
example, administration costs for a fund with 500,000 members 
rose from about $100 to $200 per account in constant dollars 
(Figure 3).  
 
Figure 2: MySuper administration fees reduce retirement balances 
$ Thousands – reduction in superannuation balance at retirement due to 
administration fees – MySuper products. 
 
Notes: Assumes 40 year contribution period; 1.8 per cent real wage growth; 5 per cent real 
investment returns (net of tax); starting wage $45,000; contributions 10% of wage. Does 
not adjust for capped fees (e.g. Mercer caps administration at $600/year, QANTAS caps 
total fees at $1300/year). Variable administration fees for the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile 
are 0.06%, 0.2%, and 0.38% respectively.  
Sources: Grattan analysis of APRA (2014m), OECD (2012). 
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Figure 3: Administration expenses have risen for all fund sizes 
Average administration operating expense per account - $2013 
 
Notes: Grattan analysis of fund APRA reported ‘total operating expenses’. Values are 
those predicted by a linear-log model of operating expenses as a function of the number of 
accounts. Omitted funds with operating expenses >$2,000/account and with <5,000 
members. Not adjusted for inactive accounts: the adjusted scale curve is slightly flatter but 
the increase over time is the same when adjusted. The costs of both industry and retail 
funds rose. 
Sources: APRA (2014i). 
Factors that have led to the cost increases shown in Figure 3 
include regulatory and reporting requirements, the capital costs of 
the Stronger Super reforms and the cost of updating so-called 
legacy products (products that, while no longer actively marketed, 
must still be compliant with new reporting requirements). Costs 
also rise as funds compete for members with costly sales, 
marketing, and member engagement efforts, and when they add 
products and services. Individual funds may do those things to 
grow and protect market share, intending to pass on the resulting 
benefits of scale to account holders. Funds may feel “compelled 
to take on more expense... implementing expensive administrative 
arrangements… which relatively few members will utilise.”12 But 
when many funds are taking similar steps, few funds gain market 
share, so average costs rise. And the extra services may not 
provide much real value to account holders.  
Fund mergers and scale increases may have prevented even 
larger cost increases. Figure 3 shows the benefits of scale: funds 
with more accounts charge lower administration fees per member. 
In 2005 there were 183 superannuation funds managing over $50 
million of assets open to public enrolment, with 77,000 accounts 
on average.13 In 2013, this had fallen to 147 funds with 148,000 
accounts on average.14 
2.2 First inefficiency: too many unwanted accounts 
Excess accounts contribute to high administration costs in 
Australian superannuation. Some people actively choose to 
maintain two or more accounts: for insurance, to reduce taxes, to 
diversify, or because one of their accounts includes a defined 
benefit. But many others fail to consolidate accounts as they 
                                            
12 Vidler (2010). 
13 APRA (2014a). Funds with >$50 million in assets due to APRA reporting. 
Public-offer funds as defined by APRA, excluding corporate products branded 
‘public offer’ funds when they cannot be accessed by the general public.  
14 Ibid.. 
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switch jobs, and end up with more accounts than they want or 
need.  
About 14.5 million people own 30 million accounts held in non-
self-managed superannuation funds.15 In other words, there are 
15.5 million more accounts than people. Perhaps only three or 
four million of these extra accounts are needed.16 The 12 million 
excess accounts17 add about six per cent, or $360 million, to total 
administration costs, as the additional cost of servicing a single 
inactive account is about $30.18 The main costs of administering 
an inactive account are creating and distributing account 
statements and other member communications. 
Because default account holders are more likely to hold unwanted 
accounts, they are likely to bear about $300 million of the $360 
million cost of multiple accounts. 
Closing these excess accounts will reduce costs, and fees will fall 
if the reductions are passed on. People who have more accounts 
than they need would benefit. But people who have one account 
today may end up paying more. Fixed account fees average 
about $70 in MySuper (probably more in the rest of the market), 
or more than double the additional costs of administering an 
                                            
15 Discussions in 2015 with the ATO suggest that the number of people with 
superannuation in APRA-regulated funds is between 14.5 and 16 million. Given 
most public sources suggest that the total is lower, we adopt the bottom of the 
range. APRA (2014i) reports that there are 30 million accounts. A million people 
have accounts in SMSFs. 
16 Clare (2007) estimated that there were four million wanted non-primary 
accounts in 2007. 
17 There are four million small accounts in Eligible Rollover Funds (ERFs).  
18 Grattan analysis of Rice Warner data in ASFA (2014).  
inactive account. Removing 12 million excess accounts with fixed 
fees of $70 each would therefore reduce fees by $840 million. 
Funds would probably seek to recoup lost revenue by increasing 
fees per account.  
2.3 Second inefficiency: too many funds 
There are too many superannuation funds, all performing similar 
activities and duplicating costs. Removing duplication with a round 
of fund mergers could save at least $500 million. 
Running a superannuation fund involves some fixed costs that are 
largely separate from the number of members it serves. They 
include setting up the product range, building technology and 
compliance platforms, and paying for general management and 
trustee functions.  
Smaller funds can reduce fixed costs by outsourcing, or by just 
doing less in some cases. Savings from a merger can take time to 
be realised and are not guaranteed. But the strong relationship 
between unit costs and fund size (shown in Figure 3) suggests 
that over time the resulting increases in average fund size will 
help to reduce costs. 
Fixed costs account for about a third of the administration costs of 
an average superannuation fund.19 If a fund were to close and all 
its accounts were transferred to other funds, about a third of the 
administration costs for those accounts could be eliminated from 
                                            
19 Analysis of ibid. , SuperChoice (2009) & SunSuper (2014). 
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the system, and total administration costs across the two funds 
would fall by about a sixth (Figure 4).20 
Figure 4: Fund mergers could cut administration costs by one-sixth 
Per cent of administration costs  
 
Notes: For an average fund. 
Sources: Grattan analysis of ASFA (2014), SuperChoice (2009), SuperPartners Pty Ltd 
(2013), Australian Administration Services Pty Limited (2013). 
                                            
20 The analysis presented in Figure 3 is also consistent with about 1/3 of total 
administration costs for an average fund being fund-level fixed costs. The 
average administration cost of funds with 500,000 accounts are 26 per cent 
below the cost of funds with 100,000 accounts and about 10 per cent above the 
cost of funds with 1 million accounts. 
Mergers would cut costs in both the default and choice segments. 
The opportunity for savings is likely to be larger in the default 
segment because there are relatively few constraints on mergers 
between industry funds, which predominantly serve that segment.  
The 50 or so industry funds charge total administration fees of 
about $1.6 billion.21 If each of these funds merged with one of a 
similar size and cost structure, creating about 25 industry funds, 
total administration expenses could be about a sixth, or $270 
million, lower. The 160 or so retail and public sector funds charge 
about $3 billion in administration fees. Mergers among public 
sector funds may be difficult where one or both funds manage a 
defined-benefit plan, as each current plan sponsor may have 
ongoing liabilities. Similarly, the relatively concentrated retail 
segment may have less opportunity for mergers. If just a quarter 
of funds merged into existing ones, savings could be close to 
$260 million.  
Perhaps $350 million in savings across fund types would accrue 
to funds and account holders in default superannuation, with the 
rest accruing in the choice segment. 
A range of challenges could hinder any specific fund merger: 
legacy products (products that are no longer open to new 
accounts, but in which people retain accounts) and defined benefit 
interests can make it hard or impossible to consolidate a fund, for 
example. But despite potential difficulties, the merger of a number 
                                            
21 There were 52 industry funds and 165 retail and public sector funds in June 
2013. APRA (2014a). 
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of funds appears feasible. Even widespread consolidation is 
unlikely to restrict choices for account holders.22  
2.4 Third inefficiency: many funds charge high 
administration fees  
Many funds charge much higher administration fees than lean 
funds do. Lean funds charge administration fees of just $100 per 
account, compared to a system average of $230. In the default 
market, fees today are not much higher than $100 per account – a 
reasonable benchmark for default administration fees given the 
superannuation system’s market structure and current technology.  
Some funds of all types (industry, retail, public sector, and 
corporate) report expense ratios and charge administration fees of 
little more than $100. But the operations of industry funds offer the 
more reliable guide to attainable costs, because they are less 
likely to share costs among different business areas.23 The 
lowest-cost funds’ expenses per member all sit at about $100 per 
year (Figure 5), even after adjusting for the varying proportions of 
inactive accounts.24  
                                            
22 The very largest fund in the default part of the market has about 1/6 of the 
default market (and 1/15 of the entire public offer market), so only mergers 
between the largest funds could pose concerns about competition in that market.  
23 Costs reported by retail and corporate funds may be affected by how costs are 
allocated between superannuation and non-superannuation arms of integrated 
businesses, between investment and administration, and between 
superannuation products managed by the same firm.  
24 Funds that report operating expenses of around $80-90 per member appear to 
benefit from a large proportion of inactive accounts. 
Independent benchmarking studies of funds’ cost structures also 
suggest that $100 per account is attainable given current rates of 
inactive accounts. One study of 10 not-for-profit funds found that 
the median administration expense was $117 a year in 2013.25 
Figure 5: Lean funds administer accounts for $100 today 
Administration expenses and fees per account 
 
Notes: The number of MySuper members are not published by APRA, the chart in the 
second panel assumes product membership as if all accounts were $50,000. The left panel 
excludes two products with operating expense greater than $500 per person. If the 
operating expenses shown in the left panel is adjusted for contributions per account 
(generated by a linear regression of operating expenses against contributions per 
account), fewer funds have costs that are below $100 per account.  
Sources: Grattan analysis of APRA (2014i), APRA (2014m). 
                                            
25 CEM Benchmarking report accessed in SunSuper (2014). 
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Another benchmarking study of 12 larger-than-average funds 
found the median administration expense to be $106 per account 
in 2013.26 
It is difficult to assess what contributes to the gap between the 
administration fees charged by the leanest funds and others, 
including choice accounts. Administration expenses can be 
grouped into three categories: 
• The costs of efficiently provided core services, such as 
payments, insurance claims processing, compliance, and 
basic member communications.  
• The costs of efficiently provided and valuable additional 
services. Members’ benefits may exceed costs for some, but 
not all, communications, advice platforms, and investment 
choices.  
• Excess costs, such as inefficiently provided core services, or 
lower-value services such as marketing and sales effort, costly 
member communications, or overly diverse product lines. 
At least half of the administration costs of a large and relatively 
efficient fund are likely to be dedicated to core services (Figure 6). 
The average fund – charging on average over twice as much as 
these funds – must either be operating core administration 
                                            
26 Rice Warner research as presented in ASFA (2014). 
functions at higher cost or spending much more on discretionary 
services.27 
Figure 6: Lean funds spend little on discretionary services 
$ operating expense per function per account 
 
Notes: Each data point is the median from each category (the median of the components 
totals $106, the median administration cost is $105). The sample is a peer group of 
relatively large not-for-profit funds.  
Sources: Rice Warner research, published in ASFA (2014). 
                                            
27 A frequently cited contributor to the high costs of superannuation is that 
Australian funds must process insurance claims. It is unclear what the average 
costs of administering insurance claims and processing are, but a sample of 12 
large funds spent just $8 per member on it (Rice Warner research, published in 
ASFA (2014)). 
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Such additional services cost many account holders tens of 
thousands of dollars over their working lives. To be justifiable, 
they would have to create more than that in value for members.  
Some evidence suggests, however, that extra administration 
costs may not create much additional value for account holders. 
Funds with high administration costs do not appear to provide 
more valuable member services. A survey of account holders 
shows that they do not value the member services of funds with 
high fees and operating expenses any more than those of low-fee 
funds.28  
Research firms also do not appear to rate more expensive funds 
more highly. The funds that superannuation research firms 
recognise for their member services report lower average 
operating expenses and administration fees than the funds that 
are not recognised for their service (Figure 7). 
From the point of view of each fund, spending on discretionary 
low-value services may be justifiable if it helps retain existing 
members and win new accounts. Building membership can help 
funds provide scale benefits to members. But policymakers 
should see these costs as contributing to the superannuation 
                                            
28 CHOICE Australia (2010). Respondents were asked: ‘Rate your satisfaction 
with the level of customer service’ on a 1-10 scale. There were 496 respondents 
to this question whose superannuation fund could be matched to products in 
existence in 2010. Respondents were also asked ‘Rate your satisfaction with the 
fund’s call centre’ (n = 382). Respondents did not rate more expensive funds 
more highly on this measure either. Both measures of a funds’ services were 
also unrelated to MySuper fees in 2014 and the per-account operating expense 
in dollars in 2010 and 2014.  
system’s failure to reach its prime goal – providing retirement 
incomes to replace or supplement the age pension.  
Figure 7: Funds recognised for member services are not more 
expensive 
Fund reported operating expense, $2013, unweighted mean. 
 
Notes: 11 ‘winners and finalists’ (one winner and ten finalists) listed by Chant West and ten 
listed by Selecting Super. Public-offer funds that currently offer MySuper (14 winners, 45 
non-winners) are included in this analysis. When expenses are FUM-weighted, non-
winners’ fees are much higher. Award winners also charge lower MySuper admin fees 
(unweighted & FUM-weighted). Chant West winners are judged on three sub-criteria: 
communication materials (40%), education (40%) and advice services (20%). Selecting 
Super winners are ‘personal Super products with the most extra benefits and services 
offered’. 
Sources: Grattan analysis of Selecting Super (2013), Chant West (2014c), APRA (2014w), 
APRA (2014m). 
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2.5 There are large potential savings in default and choice 
administration 
Administration fees per person in default funds are about $210 a 
year, when they could and should be $125 (Figure 8). In total, 
there is about $750 million of excess costs in default 
superannuation today. Excess accounts, subscale funds and 
excess cost in some funds all make a contribution. Default 
account holders are likely to bear around $300 million of the $360 
million cost of multiple accounts. They also bear about $350 
million through the burden of an excess number of funds.  
Many people in MySuper products do pay low administration fees 
today. People with a single account in a lean fund can pay under 
$100 a year. But people in higher-cost funds, or the many people 
with multiple accounts, pay much more. As accounts grow, 
administration fees will rise for all account holders who pay 
variable fees. 
Fees in the choice market are much higher. A move towards $100 
per account in the choice market could save more than $2 billion 
a year and put many tens of thousands of dollars in accounts at 
retirement. Funds may provide additional services and options in 
the choice segment. The segment is more costly for funds to 
operate in, as they have less recourse to wholesale forms of 
competition. Instead, they market directly to individuals and firms. 
$100 per account may be a useful point of comparison to 
determine whether choice products are providing sufficient value.  
Figure 8: There are large potential administration cost savings in 
default and choice superannuation  
Estimated administration fees per person in default and choice sectors, $ 
per year 
 
Note: Does not include reductions in advice costs. Model is based on average MySuper 
account sizes of $25,000. The achievable cost factors in 1.1 accounts per person after 
excess accounts are consolidated. Choice includes pension products.  
Sources: Total FUM in each sector (APRA), from number of people with superannuation 
(ATO, ABS), and total number of accounts (APRA).  
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3. Average investment management fees are too high
High investment management fees also reduce the 
superannuation balances of many Australians. Account holders 
pay about $7.9 billion a year in investment management fees, 
about 0.6 per cent of their balances. The range of fees in 
MySuper products is wide: from about 0.3 per cent to more than 1 
per cent a year. 
Some account holders are doing well; others are paying too much 
for their investments. Overall, Australians pay at least $2 billion 
more than they would if all funds charged the fees that the leanest 
high-performing funds charge. 29  
Larger savings beyond this $2 billion may be possible. Broader 
use of fund managers whose approach to investment 
management is less active than others could save at least further 
$750 million.30  
3.1 Many are paying excessive investment fees 
Grattan’s 2014 report, Super Sting, showed that total fees – the 
sum of administration and investment fees – are eroding returns.31 
Some analysts acknowledged that some funds do charge 
excessive investment fees, but said there was little evidence that 
                                            
29 Figure excludes investment fees paid by self-managed superannuation funds, 
estimated at about $3 Billion (Rice Warner (2014)). 
30 The figure of $750 million is reached by taking the retail fees for such products 
today as a guide. Wholesale fees are lower and may be more reflective of the 
costs account holders in large funds would pay.  
31 Chant West (2014a). 
funds that charged more moderate investment fees were charging 
too much.32 In response we have undertaken further analysis to 
focus on investment performance. The findings suggest that on 
average many Australians are paying too much for investment 
management of their superannuation. 
When we compare superannuation products with similar 
investment strategies, higher-fee products generate lower returns 
over the long run than their lower-fee counterparts. This is the 
case in many single-asset-class products, which invest in just one 
type of asset, such as cash, Australian equities, or Australian 
fixed income.  
Even in so-called multi-sector products, which invest in a wide 
range of asset classes, there are many overpriced products that 
clearly underperform, though varying asset allocation between 
multi-sector products can obscure the impact of fees.  
                                            
32 See Mercer (2014b) for example. 
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3.1.1 High-fee single-sector products have lower returns  
Within some single-asset-class products, higher investment fees 
are associated with lower returns.  
Figure 9 shows that higher fee products are associated with lower 
returns for the major Australian-listed asset classes, which make 
up the largest share of Australian superannuation investments.33 
The relationship is strong in fixed income. Australian equities 
produce a greater spread of returns, but the link between high 
fees and low returns is also strong, and statistically significant at 
the 95 per cent confidence level. A broad spread of returns is to 
be expected, because the group of Australian equity products 
includes funds that follow very different investment strategies. 
                                            
33 The analysis uses a dataset of investment fees and returns of superannuation 
products maintained by the private data provider, Morningstar. It includes 
superannuation products that are available to any member of the public, but not 
those of public sector and corporate funds available only to employees of 
particular organisations (‘non-public-offer’ products). We exclude all products 
designated by Morningstar as closed; all products that have front or back loading 
fees; and all products for which the management fee is zero, greater than 1.5, or 
equal to or greater than the indirect cost ratio. For each investment manager in 
each Morningstar category we extract the manager’s product offered at the 
lowest investment fee. These screens remove many actual high fee products but 
reduce the risk of using misreported investment fees. The average of these fees 
across all products and asset classes was 0.6 per cent a year in 2014. That is 
close to the average fee across the entire superannuation sector (including the 
fees of non-public offer products). The measure of returns net of investment fee 
used is the net return plus the indirect cost ratio minus the investment fee. 
Figure 9: High fees reduce returns in Australian asset classes  
Per cent annual returns relative to peers after investment management 
fees, 2004-14 
 
Notes: A single investment management product is often available at different fees across 
different funds and platforms. We use the lowest fee at which each product is available & 
its total FUM across funds and platforms.  
Sources: Grattan analysis of Morningstar Direct Australia Superannuation Funds dataset. 
International products are more diverse than domestic 
investments: some are hedged against currency movements, 
some unhedged; they may offer exposures to different regions 
that face different risks. The dataset has too few observations to 
provide any basis to draw conclusions about how fees relate to 
net returns in these product classes.34 
                                            
34 The relationship is not significantly different from zero for international equity 
and international fixed income. 
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About 20 per cent of superannuation investments are in unlisted 
and alternative asset classes, including directly-held property and 
infrastructure, private equity, and hedge funds.35 Within these 
products, investment fees are important to returns. Using the fees 
and returns of unlisted assets managed for 28 global leading 
pension funds, CEM, a respected benchmarking firm, concluded 
that the “performance differences are primarily due to cost 
differences”.36  
3.1.2 Fees and returns in multi-sector products reflect 
asset allocation 
Multi-sector products offer exposure to a range of asset classes. 
They have the largest share of superannuation assets and all 
MySuper products are multi-sector products. Figure 10 shows 
how investment fees relate to net returns in a large (but not 
complete) dataset of multi-sector products.37 It shows that across 
products with lower exposures to risk, higher fees are linked to 
lower net returns.38 Among the higher risk products, there is much 
more variability, reflecting large differences in investment strategy 
and asset allocation, and no discernible relationship to fees.  
                                            
35 APRA (2014w). 
36 Heale (2014). 
37 The dataset is screened according to the same rules used in Figure 9. The 
dataset excludes non-public-offer products such as those made available to 
public servants by public sector funds or by corporate funds to their employees. 
38 The lines in Figure 12 indicate the average relationship between fees and 
returns within each risk category. An increase in investment fees of 1 per cent 
produces an average decrease in returns of 1.1 per cent in the lower-risk group. 
The shaded areas indicate 95 per cent confidence bands. 
Figure 10: High fees reduce returns in some multi-sector asset 
classes 
Per cent annual returns of multi-sector products relative to their peers 
after investment management fees, 2004-2014 
 
Notes: A single investment management product is often available at different fees across 
different funds and platforms. We use the lowest fee at which each product is available & 
its total FUM across funds and platforms. Low risk includes Morningstar’s Conservative, 
Moderate and Balanced categories; High Risk includes Growth and Aggressive categories. 
Sources: Grattan analysis of Morningstar Direct Australia Superannuation Funds dataset. 
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Figure 10 also shows that some industry funds have outperformed 
others that charge similar fees. In the lower-risk group, industry 
funds are relatively low cost (but still outperform others). In the 
high-risk group, their average fees are not particularly low.  
Many industry funds have recorded good performance because 
they have strong exposures to asset classes that have performed 
well. In 2013 industry funds as a group (including funds not 
included in our dataset and so not displayed in Figure 10) had 
about 29 per cent of their investments in unlisted assets 
compared to an average in non-industry funds of about 16 per 
cent.39  
Those asset classes have produced higher returns over the last 
decade, and they also cost more to manage (Figure 11). The 
figure shows fees and 10-year net real returns for five liquid asset 
classes and for unlisted property, a less liquid asset class. 
Average fees for publicly available products vary from under 0.3 
per cent for cash to about 0.8 per cent for international equity. 
Unlisted property fees routinely exceed one per cent. Unlisted 
infrastructure, not shown on the chart, can cost much more than 1 
per cent to operate and has generated strong returns for many 
funds.40 
Figure 10 may give the impression that fees do not matter much 
in the high-risk multi-sector products. But to draw that conclusion 
would be a misunderstanding. Multi-sector products are 
assembled from single-sector exposures, so fees remain key to 
good performance in them as well. 
                                            
39 APRA (2014m). 
40 Cummings and Ellis (2011). 
Figure 11: More costly asset classes have performed strongly 
Nominal net returns, per cent 2004-2014 
 
Notes: Fees are for the sample in Figures 9 and 10, except for unlisted property. Direct 
property investment fees were not available in the Morningstar dataset. Industry 
consultation suggests that investment management fees for unlisted assets exceed 1 per 
cent. 
Sources: Grattan Analysis of superannuation products currently available and listed in 
Morningstar’s superannuation database. Direct property returns are from Morningstar’s 
Median Unlisted Property index.  
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3.2 Lean high-performing funds charge fees well below 
the MySuper average 
The above sections show that within asset classes, lower-fee 
products tend to perform better than others, and that asset 
allocation is also important to returns. But what is an appropriate 
target for fees?  
Figure 12 compares today’s MySuper average fee with the fees of 
lean high-performing funds, public sector funds, and large 
corporate tenders. These three quite different groups all have fees 
that are significantly lower than the system average of about 0.6 
per cent and the MySuper average of 0.64 per cent.41  
The investment fees of public sector investment funds are about 
0.52 per cent a year, as shown in Figure 12.42 Public sector funds 
as a group have achieved the highest average net returns over 
the 14 years to 2013.43 
                                            
41 The MySuper fee is a FUM-weighted average, including an allocation of 
accrued default amounts to their probable destination MySuper products. 
42 Research firm Chant West estimates public sector investment fees are 0.45; 
Rice Warner (2014) estimates them as 0.52. It is likely that these funds offer 
more exposure to unlisted assets than the system average. If their investment 
fees were applied to system average asset mix they may be 0.05 per cent lower. 
43 Source: APRA (2014w). Their average annual returns exceeded those of the 
entire APRA-regulated superannuation industry by 1.1 percentage points, 
industry funds by 0.6 percentage points, and retail funds by 2.2 percentage 
points per year over that period. Some of the differential in net returns is due to 
lower administration fees but administration fees cannot account for all of the 
difference. 
Figure 12: The average annual default investment fee is 0.2 per 
cent higher than that of today’s high performers 
List and corporate investment fees for an otherwise identical product 
Notes: Lean fund single sector products are applied to system average asset allocation; 
public sector average is probably higher in more costly unlisted products than system 
average; the corporate fee is for large tenders (see note in the text).  
Sources: Rice Warner (2014); APRA (2014m); Grattan analysis.  
The ‘lean fund single-sector products’ fee in Figure 12 is for a 
group of low-fee, high performing funds.44  
                                            
44 Funds are chosen based on their size in 2014, performance over the ten years 
2005-2014, and availability of data on individual asset class fees. The first 
source is the list of ten funds with the largest balanced products in 2014, as 
identified by Chant West (2014a). The second source is the list of the 20 funds 
0.43
0.52
0.45
0.64
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Lean fund single-
sector products
Public sector
average
Corporate
tender
Default
average
Super savings 
Grattan Institute 2015 24 
Large corporate tenders also pay relatively low investment fees, 
averaging 0.45 per cent, as Figure 12 shows.45 Fees are often 
significantly below the fees of equivalent products offered to 
smaller customers. For example, one large corporate product has 
an investment fee of 0.45 per cent. It and a MySuper product with 
an investment fee of 0.61 per cent per year are managed by the 
same fund invested identically.46  
The lean high performing funds and public sector funds do things 
differently to other funds, helping to reduce costs. Many of the 
funds are non-profit, possibly making a contribution to low fees. 
Typically they manage large portfolios. Their scale can reduce the 
fees they pay to external asset managers. It can also make in-
house asset management economic and permit funds to 
implement cost saving measures such as centralised portfolio 
management.47 Their example suggests that one way to reduce 
average investment fees in superannuation is by more 
widespread adoption of the scale and investment style of these 
large lean funds. The tender recommended in Chapter 6 would 
                                                                                     
with the highest-performing default products in the 10 years to 2014 for which 
single-asset-class fee data were available, as sourced from SuperRatings 
(2014b). After duplicated funds and funds without sufficient data were removed, 
the processes yielded a total number of 23 funds. The fee is calculated in the 
following way. We collected the funds’ single-asset class product fees. We 
calculated the fee of the 20th percentile product in each asset class (that is, the 
fee that is above 20 per cent of products’ fees, and below 80 per cent). Applying 
those fees to the asset mix managed by the superannuation system gives an 
average fee of 0.43 per cent a year. 
45 Rice Warner (2014). 
46 Sourced from Fair Work Commission submissions and product disclosure 
statements. 
47 Williams (2014).  
increase the share of default superannuation managed in this 
way. 
The same forces make it possible to set low investment fees for 
corporate tenders. It can be efficient to place additional tranches 
with an investment manager who is already managing assets on 
behalf of a fund. Selling costs can also be much lower than for 
products sold to smaller firms and individuals, and some 
superannuation funds may elect to charge a lower operating 
margin on investment management fees. Either way, the low 
investment fees achieved could be more broadly emulated if more 
superannuation investment were organised in large tranches.  
3.3 Less active investment styles may further reduce fees 
This section provides additional evidence that Australian 
superannuation investment management may be provided for 
less. To assess whether Australian equities managers could cut 
costs and maintain performance, we created individual 
benchmarks for 64 Australian investment managers following a 
well-established approach from the finance literature called factor 
analysis. 48  
To make the benchmarks, we used a few easily observed 
attributes of the firms traded on the Australian stock market, 
known as factors. Over a period of time, share market 
performance may be high for small companies (the size factor), or 
for companies whose share prices have already risen recently 
(the momentum factor), or for companies whose accounting 
values are high compared to their market values (the value 
                                            
48 Carhart (1997); Cremers, et al. (2012). 
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factor). In constructing the individual benchmarks, we use these 
factors as well as the broader market. We find the factor portfolio 
that best mimics each manager’s strategy, by calculating how that 
manager’s performance correlates with the performance of the 
four factors. 
Figure 13 shows the performance of these 64 Australian large-cap 
equities managers against the ASX 200 accumulation index (a 
common market benchmark), and against their custom 
benchmarks. It shows that most managers outperformed the 
market benchmark. (For this exercise, we take the data at face 
value, but see the Box to the right for reasons why historical fund 
performance data can be biased in favour of showing 
outperformance). Most managers underperformed their custom 
benchmarks.49 About the same proportion strongly outperformed 
their custom benchmarks (5.5 per cent) as would be expected as 
a result of chance (5 per cent). 
Similar results have been found internationally: much mutual fund 
performance across many countries seems to be largely 
explained by exposure to factors.50 Much of the additional value 
appears to be generated by momentum: that is, funds that do well 
typically hold shares that rise over successive periods rather than 
successively identifying shares that rise. 
                                            
49 We also constructed a forward-looking version of the analysis – one that uses 
only data available at each point in time. The analysis has less statistical power, 
but the median fund does not outperform the resulting forward-looking 
benchmark. 
50 For the US, see Carhart (1997), and Fama and French (2010). For the UK, 
see Cuthbertson, et al. (2008). For a review of the correlates of mutual fund 
performance across 27 countries, see Ferreira, et al. (2012).  
Can asset managers outperform on average? 
Investment managers are compared to market benchmarks in 
assessing whether they provide value for money. Many perform 
about as well as their benchmarks before fees because their 
holdings are very similar to their benchmark (Petajisto (2013)). A 
few managers beat the market over the long term.51  
In some markets, over some periods, even the median 
institutional investor appears to beat the market. Such findings 
can be due to mismeasurement. Lower-performing managers are 
more likely to drop out of many datasets (survivorship bias). Even 
surviving managers may tend to report historical returns that are 
more favourable (so-called “backfill bias”). Managers may take 
greater risks than common benchmark indices and may not 
outperform after adjustment for risk or asset class.52  
The median fund may outperform if others – foreign or individual 
investors, or a few institutional funds – underperform. Meyer et al. 
(2012) show that individual investors in Germany underperform 
the market. AMP (2014) notes that Australian individuals may 
make mistakes that institutional managers avoid. Some managers 
may pay lower transaction costs, or have opportunities that retail 
investors do not, such as preferential access to capital raisings.  
But even genuine outperformance may be achievable at lower 
cost. This is explored in the text.  
                                            
51 Fama and French (2010) find that a slightly larger proportion of US mutual 
fund managers outperform over the long run than would be expected by chance.  
52 See Carhart (1997) for an introduction. 
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A manager that undertakes the costly task of researching and 
selecting individual stocks (and charges fees to cover those costs) 
should be able to beat its custom benchmark. What should we 
make of managers who beat a broad market benchmark but not a 
custom benchmark?  
There are two possible explanations. First, they may be taking 
additional risks that pay off in some circumstances. That may or 
may not be a good strategy for the long run. Second, they may be 
taking advantage of lasting and systematic opportunities. If foreign 
or small investors make systematic mistakes such as selling 
excessively when the market is falling, then institutional managers 
can exploit them with some reliability over the long run. 
In either case, finding such opportunities can cost less than the 
‘fully active’ management style of building a portfolio based on 
detailed assessment of individual firms. Figure 14 indicates the 
savings that may be achievable through buying such less active 
investment styles. Superannuation funds typically pay active 
equity managers from 0.2 to 0.6 per cent a year in fees, with 
larger sums being managed for lower fees. Partially passive 
approaches, such as the rule-based approaches we used in 
constructing the custom benchmarks, may cost funds 0.1 to 0.2 
per cent. Fully passive products that track the market index can 
cost superannuation below 0.05 per cent a year. 
Overall, the analysis suggests that at least some of what is 
currently interpreted as skill in Australian equities management 
may be the result of factor exposures that could be achieved at 
lower cost than what superannuation funds pay today. 
Figure 13: Australian equities managers do not outperform the 
market after adjusting for factor exposures 
Count of managers, Jan 2004 – Oct 2014 
Notes: Factor benchmarks are created using the methodology outlined in Carhart (1997). 
Sources: Grattan Analysis of manager strategies available in Morningstar’s Separate 
Account/CIT database and equities from their equities database.  
The exercise does not demonstrate that such rule-based 
approaches would produce good returns after real-world 
transaction costs and tax, though one Australian study asserts 
that momentum trading would be profitable with real-world 
information lags and transaction costs.53 US funds aimed at 
momentum trading charge fees around 0.15 per cent per year.  
                                            
53Bettman, et al. (2009). 
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Figure 14: Investment management fees for Australian equities are 
lower for more passive approaches  
Per cent of funds under management per year, excluding performance 
fees 
 
Notes: Upper limits are typical investment fees for small mandates; lower limits are typical 
for large mandates. 
Source: AIST (2010). 
Such partially passive investment styles also do not apply to 
unlisted assets and may not even apply to small-cap equities 
managers. Over the past decade, Australian small-cap managers 
outperformed the S&P Australian small-cap index by 4 to 10 per 
cent a year.54 After controlling for managers’ exposures to factors 
in the way shown in Figure 13, the average small-cap manager 
                                            
54 AMP (2014) analyses small caps for the 10 years to March, 2014. 
outperformed by about 3 per cent a year. But such managers do 
not provide the opportunity to invest very large sums: stocks 
outside the ASX 100 comprise only about 11 per cent of the ASX 
market capitalisation, and stocks outside the top 200 only 4 per 
cent.55  
3.4 Few asset managers outperform for long 
Evidence on how much value investment managers create can 
also be sought by comparing managers’ performance against 
their peers. Within most asset classes, few investment managers 
consistently outperform their peers, displaying skill that would 
warrant paying them more than funds that may have performed 
less well previously.  
Figure 15 displays the performance over time of Australian 
equities managers, assembled into 10 groups by their 
performance in a given year. The figure shows there is little 
persistence in rankings across years. The top-performing ten per 
cent of managers beat the median by over 1 per cent per month in 
the first year. But in following years their performance is about 
average. Similarly, the bottom 10 per cent of managers 
underperformed by over one percentage point per month in the 
first year. In following years, their performance, too, is about 
average. The performance of the top and bottom group remains 
more volatile than that of the middle groups. Much of their initial 
deviation from the market seems to stem from taking risks that the 
rest of the market is not taking. 
                                            
55 Industry liaison suggests following other rules such as tracking stock sales by 
company directors can help to replicate small-cap outperformance.  
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Figure 15: Observed outperformance among Australian equities 
managers does not persist 
Per cent monthly relative performance, 2004-2013 
 
Notes: In each year from 2004 through to 2013, the annual returns of all Australian equities 
managers in Morningstar’s Separate Accounts/CIT database are compared to the mean of 
the group. For all years from 2004 to 2009, funds are split into deciles based on their 
outperformance. The average outperformance of each decile is calculated for the next four 
nears. Results are averaged over all runs from 2004 to 2009.  
Sources: Grattan analysis of all Australian Equity managers in Morningstar’s Separate 
Accounts/CIT database. 
The few managers in listed asset classes who do outperform their 
peers over successive periods before fees are difficult to identify 
in advance. By the time an investment star is recognized for its 
high performance, it is usually already fading back to the average. 
Persistence in asset manager performance may not 
be primarily due to skill  
Other studies suggest that asset managers who perform well 
have a slight tendency to continue to do so in the future. But 
persistence in performance does not appear to be sufficient to 
help select high-performing managers in advance. 
Carhart (1997) shows that persistence in returns is largely 
because of persistence in the returns of underlying assets. Brown 
and Goetzmann (1995) find that persistence in risk-adjusted 
returns is correlated across funds, suggesting that persistence is 
probably due to managers following similar strategies. 
Bollen and Busse (2005) find there is more performance 
persistence among wholesale asset managers than among 
mutual fund managers offering accounts to the public. But high-
performing wholesale managers attract higher in-flows, and their 
relative performance tends to fall once this happens.  
Jenkinson et al. (2014) show that the median asset consultant—
whose role includes selecting asset managers—recommends low-
performing equities managers as frequently as high-performing 
managers.  
The findings call into question how many high performing 
managers have genuine skill.56 It also suggests that 
superannuation funds may have little basis on which to identify 
managers that will go on to perform strongly in future. It may be 
                                            
56 The analysis cannot identify valuable trading strategies such as strategies that 
underperform in most years but have large outperformance occasionally.  
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argued that funds examine team quality and investment style as 
well as past performance in selecting managers. But such 
considerations may be no more helpful than past performance in 
selecting asset managers.  
3.5 Summary of potential investment savings 
Across the system, there would be large savings if fees could 
approach those of current lean high performing funds. Figure 16 
sets out the corresponding system costs. If the whole industry 
charged the 0.45 per cent per year of today’s lean higher 
performers, rather than the average 0.6 charged today, savings 
would amount to about $2.1 billion a year, more than a quarter of 
all investment management fees, with no change in asset 
allocation.  
Savings would still be large if restricted to default products only. If 
MySuper products were charged the lean funds’ 0.45 per cent 
rather than today’s 0.64 per cent average, savings would amount 
to about $800 million a year.57  
Further savings could result from the use of passive or partially 
passive approaches in some listed asset classes. However, given 
the provisional nature of the evidence in favour of partially passive 
approaches, in our analysis of potential policy savings, no shift 
further towards passive products is assumed. 
                                            
57 Even reducing above-average MySuper product investment fees to the current 
average would save hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Figure 16: If the whole system had the costs of leaner funds, total 
costs would be $2 billion lower 
Investment management fees, $ billion
Notes: “Today’s strong performers” is 45 basis points, per Figure 13.  
Sources: Grattan analysis of sources cited in Section 3.2. Passive fees from AIST (2010). 
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4. Why average superannuation fees are high 
Average superannuation fees are higher than they need to be for 
one main reason. Much of the system relies primarily on account-
holders and employers to select the best products, but many do 
not. Some account holders do pay attention to fees, but because 
they tend to buy different products, such as those designed for 
people with large accounts, they put relatively little fee pressure 
on average fees. 
There are many low-cost products and funds, as earlier chapters 
in this report document, often reflecting the lower costs of serving 
relatively large contracts, and the influence of more sophisticated 
buyers.  
The higher costs and fees in much of the rest of the market reflect 
the costs of selling to a more fragmented and less sophisticated 
clientele. In this part of the market, funds do not compete primarily 
on fees. Instead, many compete on the basis of marketing 
campaigns, sales and distribution networks, member engagement 
services and on the breadth of their product ranges and 
investment options. All these forms of non-fee competition cost 
money, which is passed on as fees. They may do little to help 
account holders to understand what drives their long-run returns. 
The system remains inefficient and opaque, even as high fees 
erode account holders’ net returns. The lack of fee pressure also 
allows other inefficiencies to persist. 
4.1 Many account holders are disengaged 
Many Australians are not well informed about their 
superannuation or the fees they pay. Many do not actively select 
their fund, and very few switch funds except when they switch 
jobs. Many others who are more actively engaged in 
superannuation make poor decisions because they focus on 
measures other than fees. 
Figure 17 summarises the findings of three surveys of what 
people know about their superannuation and how involved they 
are. About half of account holders do not know the fees they pay. 
Three-quarters do not know their investment returns.  
A minority of people choose their own fund. A survey 
commissioned for the Australian Tax Office found that 69 per cent 
of people did not choose their own fund when they joined their 
most recent employer. 58 Similarly, an Australian Bureau of 
Statistics study found that 70 per cent of individuals have their 
primary superannuation with an employer-nominated fund. Of 
these, about two-thirds play no role in selecting their fund or 
product.59 Other studies put the proportion of employees who play 
no role in selecting a superannuation fund at 80 per cent.60 
                                            
58 Colmar Brunton (2010c). 
59 ABS (2009).  
60 See sources cited in Commonwealth of Australia (2010c), Endnote 4, p 36. 
Some of these studies appear to assume that being in a default product entails 
not having exercised any choice. 
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Finally, very few people — about two per cent of Australians with 
a superannuation account, at most — switched funds in 2013 for 
reasons other than switching jobs or their employer switching 
default funds.61  
 
Of those who actively choose a fund, many say they seek to 
minimise fees. When asked what mattered in their choice of 
superannuation funds, 68 per cent said low fees and 62 per cent 
said high or strong investment returns.62 Nevertheless, the 
surveys show that in reality very few know, compare, or act on the 
fees they pay. 
There is also a wide array of evidence that many account holders 
under-value the importance of fees and do not respond much to 
fees. As one recent study puts it, “underweighting of fees is 
pervasive and sticky, robust to demographic variation and investor 
experience.”63 Unresponsiveness to fees is commonly found in 
studies of Australian and other account holders.64 There may be 
several reasons why. Individuals may find it hard to compare 
superannuation funds because they do not understand the 
                                            
61 3-9 per cent (Colmar Brunton (2010c), Roy Morgan (2013)) switch 
superannuation funds in each year. Around 80 per cent of them switch funds 
because they change jobs or their employers change funds providers 
(Commonwealth of Australia (2010a)). 
62 Colmar Brunton (2010c). 
63 Fisch and Wilkinson-Ryan (2013). 
64 Langford, et al. (2006), Choi, et al. (2010); references cited on p.4 and p.5 of 
Calderón-Colín, et al. (2008). 
financial basics that are needed to make a wise choice of fund.65 
They may also defer decisions that affect their future wellbeing. 
Figure 17: Few account holders are well-informed and fewer 
actively switch funds 
Survey findings on superannuation account holders’ knowledge and 
action on their accounts, per cent of respondents 
Source: Q1: Financial Services Council and ING Direct (2013), Q2-3:Colmar Brunton 
(2010c), Q4: Colmar Brunton (2010c), Commonwealth of Australia (2010a).  
                                            
65 Worthington (2008), Agarwal, et al. (2009); Capuano and Ramsay (2011); 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2011); Fisch and Wilkinson-Ryan (2013); Bateman, et al. 
(2014) . 
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4.2 Many employers are disengaged  
Employers play an important role in selecting default funds. Many 
of them are no more engaged or informed about superannuation 
than are their employees. Some may select funds that offer a 
broad range of options at high cost to employees. Some may 
consider their own costs and benefits before benefits for their 
staff. 
Many employers are poorly informed about the performance and 
fees of the default funds they have selected on behalf of their 
employees. In a survey commissioned by the Australian Tax 
Office, 49 per cent of employers reported very little or no 
knowledge of their default fund’s investment performance over the 
last year (Figure 18). Only 25 per cent said they had compared 
the investment performance of the employer-nominated default 
fund, and about 30 per cent said they had compared the fees with 
those of other funds.  
Of all employers interviewed, only seven per cent had ever 
switched their default fund. These are likely to be the larger 
employers, so coverage of employees by employers who have 
switched must be much larger than seven per cent. Discounts 
achieved by large employers can exceed 50 per cent, indicating 
the potential for more widespread use of the procurement models 
used by sophisticated employers. 
Figure 18: Few employers are well informed or active in selecting 
default funds 
Employer knowledge of and action on the funds they nominate for 
employees, per cent of respondents 
 
 
Source: Colmar Brunton (2010a). 
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Employers may also be motivated to select a superannuation 
provider that offers a wide range of investment options to their 
employees, even though products with many investment options 
typically charge high fees.66  
Some employers may also select providers for reasons other than 
the best interests of their employees. Eleven per cent of large 
employers and four per cent of smaller ones report that the funds 
they chose had offered them incentives. 67 While incentives in the 
form of lower superannuation fees are in the interests of 
employees, some employers also said they had received offers of 
discounts on non-superannuation financial products such as credit 
cards and home loans.68 The head of one bank-owned fund has 
noted that it is convenient for companies to have various services 
supplied by the one bank because “it makes relationship 
management seamless”.69 While efficient banking and 
superannuation relationships are a good thing, employers may in 
some instances pay more attention to their overall banking 
relationship than to the value-for-money of the superannuation 
fund that comes with that relationship. 
                                            
66 Rainmaker Information (2013), p. 8. 
67 ‘Large’ companies are those with more than 100 staff. 
68 Colmar Brunton (2010a). 
69 Patten (2014). 
4.3 Pressure from engaged customers has not cut fees 
much for others  
Superannuation is simple in principle. It should offer exposure to 
assets that provide a good basis for accumulation of funds as the 
account holder nears retirement. Yet superannuation has come to 
be sold as a broad range of superficially differentiated products. 
There are hundreds of funds, most offering multiple products that 
are sold directly to customers – via telephone or the web, for 
example – or via distribution networks such as bank branches and 
financial advisers. Some funds offer few investment options, 
others many. Funds charge fees in diverse ways, including fees 
upon entry and exit, and ongoing annual fees charged as flat 
dollar amounts and as a percentage of account value. They offer 
different online and other service options.  
Such broad choice can benefit active and engaged account 
holders, and indeed, some look for and find lower superannuation 
fees. Others — typically those with larger balances — may find it 
beneficial to set up a self-managed fund. Some large firms may 
negotiate discounts, while workers in the public sector or in some 
industry funds also pay low fees.  
But such product and price dispersion also separates more 
sophisticated and fee-sensitive customers from the many who are 
disengaged. Disengaged customers get little, if any, benefit from 
pressure exerted by fee-sensitive shoppers. Those who have 
smaller balances, or whose employers choose a high-fee fund, or 
who simply do not appreciate the importance of fees can end up 
paying fees that are far too high.  
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4.4 Inattention to fees has permitted costs to grow largely 
unchecked 
The inattention of many account holders to fees has driven 
providers to seek to differentiate themselves with a range of 
diverse products and services. They have developed sales and 
distribution activities to capture and protect profitable market 
share. They have developed a range of product and service 
features such as platforms that provide a broad range of 
investment options.  
All these features drive up costs and fees. Competition on these 
features, rather than on fees, does not remove other inefficiencies 
such as excess pay, manual processes or overly active 
management of funds that further reduce net returns.  
Funds bear the costs of distribution, sales, marketing and product 
differentiation.70 These costs make sense for each fund but they 
hurt the net returns of investors. Funds report that marketing and 
distribution costs are about 7 per cent of total costs, though some 
commission costs appear to be omitted from APRA reporting.71  
But the full costs of product differentiation and member 
engagement must be much higher than the reported cost of 
marketing and distribution alone. They would include many of the 
capital and operational costs of engaging members, creating 
product ranges and providing a choice platform that allows 
consumers to make decisions about where their money is 
                                            
70 Williams (2014). 
71 Arnold (2012). 
invested. These costs are not reported separately but constitute a 
large fraction of the non-investment costs of super funds.  
Some funds incur other costs that further reduce net returns. 
Some retail trustees use related-party administrators and pay 
higher fees.72 In some cases, there is evidence that fee 
negotiations do not extract reasonably expected value from 
external asset managers.73  
As a result of all these factors, non-fee competition over the last 
decade has largely absorbed benefits from improvements in 
technology and scale. 
                                            
72 Liu and Arnold (2010). 
73 Sy and Liu (2010). 
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5. Recent policy initiatives will not cut fees much
Chapters two and three reveal the large gap between current and 
achievable costs in superannuation. The policy changes 
governments have made in recent years go in the right direction, 
and together are likely to save over a billion dollars a year, as 
Figure 19 shows. They also provide a platform for further savings. 
Yet they need to go further to save substantial sums. 
At present the total bill for running superannuation is about 1.2 per 
cent of funds under management a year, or $16 billion across the 
collective funds, plus about $5 billion in self-managed super.  
The Stronger Super reforms, to be phased in by 2017, seek to 
simplify default products, reduce administrative costs, improve 
governance of superannuation funds, and improve confidence in 
the self-managed superannuation sector. The two key elements of 
the reforms, SuperStream and MySuper, may reduce annual 
costs and fees by about $800 million below business as usual in 
the next few years. Most of these savings will be realised in the 
default segment. 
The Future of Financial Advice (FoFA) reforms, introduced in 
2012 to protect investors who receive financial advice, may 
reduce fees on choice products over time. The savings will take 
time to be realised, as the reforms only restrict commissions on 
newly sold products. FoFA savings will accrue in the choice 
market as a reduction in commissions. 
 
Figure 19: Recent initiatives will save over a billion dollars  
$ billion fees and potential savings 
 
Notes: Collective funds only (excludes SMSFs). 
Sources: Savings set out in sections (5.1-5.3). 
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New, more explicit trustee obligations may sharpen trustees’ 
focus on costs. Yet funds have long been obliged to act in 
members’ interests, so it is unclear whether more explicit 
obligations will make much difference. The new MySuper scale 
test may spur smaller funds to merge with more efficient ones if 
trustees determine account holders are disadvantaged by their 
fund’s scale.  
Recent initiatives to consolidate accounts have slowed the 
upward trend in accounts per person. They provide a platform for 
further savings of about $360 million, but these are unlikely to be 
captured without new steps to slow the creation of excess 
accounts that occurs when people switch jobs. 
Figure 20 summarises the impacts that the major recent initiatives 
are likely to have on the default and choice parts of the market. 
Together, they could save about $600 million in the default 
segment and about $700 million in the choice segment. MySuper 
will save $500 million in defaults. FoFA savings, which may be 
about $600 million, will be realised in the choice market. 
SuperStream processing cost reductions will save a total of about 
$300 million across both segments. 
The rest of this chapter details the extent of savings that are likely 
to result from recent changes to superannuation policy. 
Figure 20: Recent initiatives offer savings in both the choice and 
default segments 
$ billion fees 
 
Notes: Collective funds only (excludes SMSFs). 
Sources: Savings set out in sections (5.1-5.3). 
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5.1 MySuper may save about $500 million 
From January 2014, all default products must be an authorised 
MySuper product, which means they must meet standards 
designed to make them easier to assess and compare.  
Average default fees on a $50,000 account, including discounts 
negotiated by employers, will fall to about 0.9 per cent a year by 
2017, when all remaining accrued default amounts must be 
transferred into MySuper products (Figure 21). The change is 
likely to reduce fees paid by default account holders by about 
$500 million a year.  
The fall in projected average default fees is due to the reduction in 
retail funds’ default fees when they introduced MySuper products. 
They remain the most expensive default funds on average (Figure 
22).  
These projected savings may not fully materialise. Not all the $72 
billion of member accounts currently in higher-fee pre-MySuper 
products (so-called ‘accrued default amounts’) will be transferred 
into MySuper products. One large retail fund disclosed to us that it 
has contacted members asking if they would like to stay on their 
existing default products rather than be transferred to a MySuper 
product. It reported that about half of the members contacted 
have agreed to stay.  
 
Figure 21: Default fees may fall by about 10 per cent due to 
MySuper 
Fees (per cent) on a $50,000 default account 
 
Notes: Assumes the $73b of Accrued Default Amounts (ADAs) are held by retail funds and 
will be rolled into retail MySuper products over the period Jul 2014-July 2017. Assumes no 
change in market shares (Industry - 55%, Retail - 21%, Public Sector - 20%, Corporate - 
4%). Assumes retail products have weighted average discounts of 0.12% off their list fee. 
Assumes that default fees pre-MySuper were 1.6% on a $50,000 balance. 
Sources: Minifie et al. (2014), p .22 and Grattan analysis of APRA (2014m). 
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Figure 22: The reduction in fees is driven by a reduction in retail 
default fees 
Fees (per cent) on a $50,000 account 
 
Notes: Assumes the $73b of Accrued Default Amounts are held by retail funds and are 
rolled into their respective MySuper products over the period Jan 2015 to July 2017. 
Assumes no change in the fees charged by Industry and Public Sector funds on a $50k 
account. Assumes average discount of 0.12% off the list price of retail MySuper products. 
Assumes that default fees pre-MySuper were 1.6% on a $50,000 balance.  
Sources: Minifie et al. (2014) and Grattan analysis of APRA (2014m). 
5.2 SuperStream data standards could save about $300 
million  
New data standards being phased in under SuperStream will 
reduce the costs of paper-based processing of payments over 
time.  
Figure 23: SuperStream could reduce processing costs by a third 
Per cent operating cost savings funds expect from SuperStream
 
Sources: FSC and Ernst & Young (2010)  
Superannuation executives estimate that SuperStream could cut 
processing costs by about 30 per cent, or $300 million a year 
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(Figure 23).74 The improvements in data standards will also save 
time for employers and funds by simplifying contribution 
processing. 
5.3 FoFA will help to reduce fees for choice 
superannuation products over the long run  
The Future of Financial Advice (FoFA) reforms, which passed into 
law in 2013, are intended to reduce, over time, any commissions 
paid unknowingly from superannuation accounts to advisers. They 
are also intended to improve the quality of financial advice. 
Government relaxed some aspects of the reforms by regulation in 
2013, but the original reforms have been reinstated. 
How FoFA might change superannuation fees is unknown. 
Financial advisers in the choice, APRA-regulated part of the 
superannuation market are estimated to earn from $1.4-$2 billion 
a year in total.75 One study projects that over time, FoFA could 
reduce the income of advisers from superannuation by about 25 
per cent, saving about $350-$500 million, or about 0.04-0.06 
percentage points a year in fees charged in the choice part of the 
market.76  
                                            
74 Evidence on the total cost of contribution processing is sparse. Benchmarking 
studies of larger, lower-cost funds suggest that payment processing in total costs 
about $20 per account, which would imply about $600m - $800m in total 
including higher costs for some funds (ASFA (2014)). SuperChoice (2009) 
makes a higher estimate for contribution processing of $1.25b. An estimate of $1 
billion for processing costs appears reasonable. It implies costs of about $30 for 
each of 30 million accounts in total, or about $70 per active account. 
75 Rice Warner and Industry Super Australia (2013); Rice Warner (2014).  
76 Rice Warner and Industry Super Australia (2013). 
Box: The Future of Financial Advice reforms 
The FoFA reforms seek to ensure that financial advisers act in the 
interests of their clients. Their four main elements are: 
The client interest test. Financial advisors must act in the best 
interests of clients. In recommending a financial product, the 
adviser must establish that it is appropriate to the client’s needs.  
A ban on conflicted remuneration. All monetary or non-
monetary benefits that product providers pay to the financial 
adviser are considered conflicted remuneration and are banned, 
including ‘volume based incentives’ and shelf space fees. 
Remuneration must instead be in the form of a fee for a specific 
instance of service, or an ‘ongoing fee arrangement’ the client 
pays to the adviser. The ban affect products sold after July 2013. 
Fee disclosure. Advisers are required to provide clients with a 
statement of “ongoing fee arrangements” every 12 months. The 
requirement is intended to assist the consumer in assessing 
whether they are receiving adequate service for their money. 
Advisers do not need to disclose commission revenue derived 
from products sold before July 2013. 
Opt-in for ongoing fees. Advisers who charge fees for ongoing 
advice must receive written confirmation from their clients every 
two years. The requirement is intended to give clients a regular 
opportunity to re-evaluate the value for money provided by their 
financial advisers. Advisers do not need to ask clients to opt-in to 
paying commission revenue derived from products sold before 
July 2013. 
Super savings 
Grattan Institute 2015 40 
A shift from commissions to direct fee for service, which some 
industry experts say is happening, is likely to lead to a reduction in 
headline superannuation fees.77 
It is difficult to predict when benefits from FoFA may be realised. 
Because FoFA does not impose restrictions or disclosure 
requirements on existing commissions paid on products sold 
before July 2013, it may take many years for FoFA to change the 
fees most people actually pay. Advisers should interpret their 
obligation to act in the best interests of their clients as requiring 
them to move their clients out of higher-cost products even if it 
reduces their own incomes. However many may not take this view 
given the explicit grandfathering of disclosure and commissions 
on products sold before mid-2013.  
5.4 Savings from account consolidation will require further 
policy initiatives 
With 12 million excess superannuation accounts in the system 
and each costing funds about $30 a year to service, excess 
administration costs are approximately $360 million a year 
(Chapter 2). Government has taken steps to encourage people to 
consolidate their accounts but has not yet slowed the creation of 
unnecessary new ones.  
Recent government initiatives have reduced the number of excess 
accounts. Superannuation funds are now required to consolidate 
multiple accounts belonging to a single account holder within a 
fund. The ATO has linked millions of accounts to tax file numbers, 
and the Government’s myGov website makes it easier for account 
                                            
77 O'Donoghue (2014). 
holders to view and consolidate their accounts. The ATO has also 
been empowered to take control of lost accounts with balances of 
less than $2000 that have not received contributions for 12 
months. Once managed by the ATO, accounts no longer incur 
fees, but only receive a guaranteed return equal to inflation. 
These initiatives have reduced account numbers. Funds have 
taken steps to consolidate the accounts they hold, though how 
many is not publicly known. Many account holders are using the 
superannuation platform on myGov. In the first half of 2014-15, 
265,000 accounts were consolidated. In addition, the ATO has 
been sent over about a million unclaimed superannuation 
accounts in the last year, in accordance with the Unclaimed 
Superannuation Money legislation.  
Nevertheless, not enough has been done to stop the creation of 
new unwanted accounts. In 2012-13, 2.3 million new employer-
sponsored accounts were created.78 Without new initiatives, the 
number of accounts per person may not fall much further, and 
could even start rising again. 
5.5 Extensive fund consolidation may require further policy 
initiatives 
If many funds were to merge, superannuation administration costs 
could fall by $500 million or more a year (Chapter 2). But such 
savings seem unlikely under current policy settings.  
Public-offer funds have consolidated steadily over the past 
decade. But this consolidation has not saved a lot of money. 
                                            
78 APRA (2014a). 
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While the number of funds has fallen by about 10 a year (Figure 
24), typically it is smaller funds – not inefficient medium and 
larger-sized funds – that close.  
Fund consolidation may be impeded by current rules that restrict 
the movement of accounts from one product to another. The rules 
dictate that an account can only be moved to a new product if it is 
judged to be equivalent to the existing one.79 Submissions to the 
Financial System Inquiry argue that the test can be overly strict 
and can impede fund mergers by making it impossible to cut costs 
by fully closing old products. They recommend that accounts be 
moved if the new product leaves account holders at no overall 
disadvantage, a less stringent test than the existing one. 
A round of fund mergers is possible in the next few years. Funds 
may have delayed mergers while they made the changes to their 
businesses required by Stronger Super. They may also be able to 
merge more easily after SuperStream comes into operation. The 
recently announced merger of two large external administrators –
which are private firms that funds outsource administration to – 
may also reduce barriers to fund mergers.80 Though, in the past 
many higher-cost funds that shared administration platforms have 
elected not to merge. The new MySuper scale test may also 
provide some impetus for funds to merge, as discussed below.  
                                            
79 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth).  
80 SuperPartners is expected to be purchased by Australian Administration 
Services. 
Figure 24: About ten public-offer funds have consolidated each 
year 
Number of public-offer funds (excluding corporate funds) 
 
Notes: Public-offer funds excluding corporate products (as determined by APRA). Only 
includes funds with assets above $50 million. 
Sources: APRA (2014a). 
Overall, it seems unlikely that fund consolidation will lead to lower 
fees soon unless competition based on net returns and its major 
long-term drivers – gross investment performance and costs – is 
markedly strengthened. 
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5.6 New trustee obligations may not change fund behaviour 
much 
Legislative amendments imposing more explicit obligations on 
superannuation funds and their boards came into force on 1 July 
2013. Yet, unless the regulator interprets them strictly, the new 
obligations may not make much difference to fund efficiency. 
For many years superannuation funds have been obliged to act in 
the best interests of their members. Trustees have long had 
obligations to fund members under a range of instruments: the 
Corporations Act, the common law of equities and trusts, the 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act and prudential 
standards on governance, conflicts, fitness, and insurance, 
among others, that have equivalent force at law to an Act.  
The amendments do make the duties of superannuation funds 
and the personal liability of individual trustees more explicit.81 In 
addition, funds offering MySuper products have assumed new 
duties and responsibilities. Perhaps the most important new duty 
is the “scale test”: fund trustees must undertake a yearly process 
to review whether their MySuper members are not disadvantaged 
due to the scale of the product or fund.  
                                            
81 New covenants on risk management, insurance and investments must be read 
into each trust. The trustee now must put the member’s interest first where there 
is a conflict between duties the member and anyone else. There is also a new 
prudential statement on Governance covering board composition, mandatory 
terms, and mandating the preparation and execution of a board renewal policy. 
The pre-existing requirement that trustees be fit and proper also now requires 
that the trustees have appropriate skills. 
Trustees may be beginning to invest more in their skills and 
education in order to meet the new more explicit and personal 
obligations. Yet only cautious optimism is justified: the long-
standing obligation to act in the best interest of members has not 
yet managed to remove many underperforming products.  
Whether consolidation hastens may depend on how strongly 
APRA applies the MySuper scale test.82 Unless APRA applies the 
test aggressively, the new trustee obligations appear unlikely to 
result in more than a few mergers.  
5.7 Individual cost savings do not necessarily result in 
aggregate cost savings 
Reductions in individual administration cost items may fail to 
reduce total costs or account holder fees. This has happened 
before. Despite the large rise in the size of the average fund 
between 2005 and 2013, a change that should have achieved 
savings for members, administration expenses rose from $125 to 
$200 per account in 2013 dollars83 
Looking ahead, fund executives say they expect their operating 
costs to rise in the next few years (Figure 25), suggesting that 
fees will not fall much unless profits decrease. And savings may 
be offset by cost increases as funds incur marketing, member 
engagement, sales and other costs in competing for members.  
                                            
82 Superannuation trustees must demonstrate that their MySuper members are 
not disadvantaged vs the account holders of MySuper products offered by other 
funds, especially on the basis of scale. 
83 APRA (2014i) ‘Operating expenses’ as reported to APRA. 
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Figure 25: Superannuation fund executives say they expect 
operating costs to increase 
Number responding - How do you anticipate that your operating costs 
will change in 3 years’? 
 
Notes: Executives answered the question: “How do you anticipate that your operating costs 
will change in 3 years’ (i.e. after Stronger Super Implementation)?” 
Sources: ASFA and PWC (2013). 
5.8 Conclusion: recent policy initiatives are likely to reduce 
fees by less than 10 per cent  
The policy initiatives introduced over the last five years have been 
positive for superannuation efficiency. But Australian costs remain 
far above the costs achieved by defined-contribution systems 
overseas that have centralised administration, or that have used 
competitive mechanisms such as tenders to drive down costs. 
Current policy initiatives seem likely to cut costs by more than 
$500 million, and perhaps as much as $1.4 billion, a year. 
MySuper and SuperStream settings could save about $800 million 
a year, or just over five per cent of total fees paid to collective 
funds. MySuper will save most of this, with a smaller contribution 
from SuperStream processing cost cuts. FoFA and new trustee 
obligations may deliver incremental benefits over the long term.  
Initiatives that affect fund and account consolidation have set the 
stage for a further $1 billion in savings, but that will only be 
realised only if policymakers aggressively pursue them by 
reducing the creation of new surplus accounts, applying the 
MySuper scale test, and seeking to shift the basis of competition 
to costs and fees. These and other initiatives are discussed in the 
next chapter.
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6. How to make superannuation more efficient
The previous chapter shows that current policy initiatives will 
remove some excess cost from the system, but much more can 
be done. To make default superannuation more efficient 
government should build on recent policy initiatives and act on the 
findings of the 2014 Financial System Inquiry (FSI). 
Government should ensure that all parties in superannuation 
recognise the vital importance of an efficient system to the 
achievement of the system’s prime objective: to provide for 
retirement incomes as a supplement or alternative to the age 
pension. Reform should have four main elements:  
• Government should run a tender to select funds for default 
superannuation. Government should not wait years to run an 
efficiency review when the evidence is already strong that 
current policy settings leave billions on the table.  
• Government should take steps to slow the creation of new 
excess accounts.  
• It should encourage less efficient funds to merge with efficient 
ones.  
• It should introduce measures to strongly encourage the 
selection of lower cost products in the choice part of the 
superannuation market.  
6.1 Potential benefits of reforms 
The first three initiatives could save more than $1.5 billion.  
• A competitive process for defaults could save over $1 billion a 
year. Government should design the tender now and run it as 
soon as possible.  
• New steps to remove excess accounts could save $360 
million a year. It would not be a particularly complex initiative 
and would be a natural extension of work that has already 
been done to consolidate accounts. 
• Steps to encourage less efficient funds in the choice segment 
to merge with efficient funds could save an extra $200 million 
a year or more. 
These three initiatives will have more impact on reducing costs in 
default than in choice funds, as Figure 26 shows. The tender is a 
default initiative, and most account consolidation savings will 
benefit default account holders. Fund consolidation in the choice 
space may be limited by the relatively large size of the five biggest 
superannuation funds, while the many smaller industry 
superannuation funds could be consolidated in the default market.  
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Figure 26: Proposed initiatives save more in defaults than in choice 
$ billion fees and savings 
 
Notes: Collective funds only (excludes SMSFs). Modelling assumes that cost reductions 
are directly passed on as fee reductions. 
Sources: Savings from current initiatives are set out in Chapter 5; savings from proposed 
initiatives are set out elsewhere in this chapter.  
The choice segment is likely to remain relatively expensive, to the 
cost of many account holders. The opportunity to save money by 
encouraging the selection of lower cost products in the choice 
parts of the market appears to be large, since the choice market is 
where the greatest excess costs appear to be. The size of the 
opportunity, though, is difficult to estimate. 
Figure 27: Policy initiatives could reduce default fees by a quarter  
$ billion fees and savings in default superannuation
 
Notes: Modelling assumes that cost reductions are directly passed on as fee reductions. 
Does not include advice fees. 
Sources: Grattan analysis. 
A tender is likely to remove much of the remaining excess cost in 
defaults. Figure 27 shows that account consolidation and the 
tender (which includes benefits from fund consolidation prompted 
by the tender) could reduce total default fees by a quarter, from 
$4.6 billion per year to $3.3 billion per year. Average fees would 
fall from about 0.9 per cent per year (post MySuper and 
SuperStream) to about 0.65 per cent per year or lower.  
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As a result of these reforms, default account holders are likely to 
retire $40,000 wealthier on average. Even people who now have 
a single account are likely to save $34,000.  
Figure 28: A typical default account holder could be $40,000 better 
off at retirement  
$ thousands in superannuation balances at retirement per person 
 
Notes: Assumes 40 years of contributions; 1.8 per cent real wage growth; 5 per cent real 
investment returns (net of tax); starting wage $45,000; contributions 10% of wage.  
The three modelled scenarios are balance at retirement under three different policy 
settings: pre-Stronger Super, post-Stronger Super, and post-tender and account 
consolidation (as recommended in this chapter). Each of these scenarios involves different 
fees and average account numbers per member: 0.85% & $75 fixed per account (pre-
Stronger Super), 0.73% & $75 fixed per account (post-Stronger Super), and 0.45% and 
$112 fixed per account (post our recommended reforms). The number of accounts per 
person in each scenario is 1.85, 1.85 and 1.1 respectively. Source: Grattan analysis. 
6.2 Run a competitive tender to select default funds 
Government should design and run a tender that would select 
funds that could offer default products.  
The FSI recommends that if a review undertaken between 2017 
and 2020 finds that current policy settings leave an efficiency gap, 
government should introduce a “competitive process” for 
allocating new default account holders to superannuation 
products.84 The FSI recommends that design of the tender begin 
this year, suggesting it expects that any review is likely to find 
continuing excess cost. If that is so, Government should act now 
to establish the tender, since delay merely costs more money.   
6.2.1 Design of the tender 
The tender would select a shortlist of default funds. It would need 
to be carefully designed and tested to ensure that the quality of 
assets in which funds are invested is maintained or improved, 
service levels are appropriate, and costs reduced. As the FSI 
emphasises, much work needs to be done to evaluate alternative 
models and finalise a preferred model for the competitive 
mechanism.  
Government should consider a broad range of options for the 
competitive process. Overseas systems or funds provide a wealth 
of experience on how government can use competitive processes 
to cut superannuation costs. Many governments have 
successfully taken similar steps with their retirement systems, 
including Sweden’s defined-contribution system, the United 
                                            
84 Financial System Inquiry (2014). 
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States’ Thrift Savings Plan, New Zealand’s Kiwisaver, and the 
Chile’s default tender.  
These systems, while not perfect, have typically produced default 
products that are typically cheaper than Australian defaults.85  
In designing a competitive mechanism, government should also 
learn from the strengths and weaknesses of the process APRA 
uses to authorise MySuper products, and of the anticipated Fair 
Work Commission process for shortlisting default funds in awards.  
Any tender process should give substantial weight to fees and 
costs. Grattan’s 2014 Super Sting report proposes that the tender 
be a fee-based auction (Figure 29), since that would suit listed 
asset classes in which low-cost, less active investment styles are 
likely to perform better than other approaches over the long run. 
For some other asset classes, fees remain important, but 
selection based purely on fees may not give investment managers 
sufficient incentive to perform.86 These classes, which include 
unlisted infrastructure, property, private equity, and venture 
capital, comprise about 20 per cent of fund portfolios. Instead of a 
fee-based tender for these classes, government could give weight 
in its selection criteria to past performance net of fees, and to 
modelling of prospective future net returns. It could also restrict 
participation to funds that have substantial continuing businesses 
in those asset classes. 
 
                                            
85 Minifie, et al. (2014), Chapter 4.  
86 Heale (2014). 
Figure 29: Elements of one tender design for default funds.
 
Source: Grattan analysis. 
Government will also need to ensure that winners are not the 
funds that best hide costs.87 Expert advice on how to make 
products comparable will be required. Investment products can be 
difficult to compare, but it can be done, and governments, 
businesses and superannuation funds already do it satisfactorily.  
Government would need to monitor the tender over time. Trustees 
of winning funds would retain their obligation to adjust their 
investment model and asset exposures to maximise risk-adjusted 
net returns for members, and would retain discretion to hire and 
                                            
87 Norvaca International (2014). 
Default 
product 
•  Asset allocation range / ranges; diversification 
•  Limits on trading volumes (churn, tax) 
•  Insurance defined separately; fixed administration fee 
•  Period: e.g. two years  
•  Applicable accounts: e.g. all new default accounts 
•  Open or closed bids; if open, number of rounds  
•  If multiple asset classes, single / simultaneous rounds 
•  Period over which winning fee remains as a cap 
•  Separate competitive tender for insurance 
•  Pre-qualification by APRA, as today 
•  Another government body to run the tender 
•  If more than one winning fund, role for employers, FWA 
•  Protections for legacy MySuper account holders 
•  Limitations on ‘upsell’ of default account holders 
•  Dashboards on legacy and choice products 
Auction 
design 
Applicable 
flows 
Roles 
Supporting 
changes 
Super savings 
Grattan Institute 2015 48 
fire asset managers. They would need to seek approval for 
material departures from the terms on which they won the 
tender.88 
Some may argue that any tender involves government too deeply 
in funds’ decisions about how to allocate their members’ assets. 
Yet continuing inefficiency in the sector must be addressed. 
Government is already deeply involved in superannuation, since it 
requires employers to contribute about 10 per cent of wages and 
salaries on behalf of most Australian workers. It has a heavy 
responsibility to make super funds provide better value.  
6.2.2 Potential savings from a tender 
Defaults already cost less than choice products. But a tender still 
presents a substantial opportunity to further cut costs in defaults 
while preserving member services and asset allocation. 
A tender would strongly shift the basis of competition towards net 
returns. Funds could cut expenditure on marketing and sales 
efforts, and on building platforms that few use to select from 
investment options that few require. A tender would strengthen 
funds’ incentives to cut costs, including via mergers, since less 
efficient funds would lose share over time.  
Funds that can offer fees of total 0.65 per cent a year or lower 
while preserving asset quality are likely to win the tender. That is 
significantly below today’s average of 0.90 per cent for MySuper 
products. Savings on today’s $465 billion of funds under 
                                            
88As time can be of the essence in some investment decisions, funds could 
retain full discretion but be required to seek such approval promptly afterwards. 
management would therefore be at least $1.1 billion a year. There 
is a strong case to use the tender only for new accounts, so 
savings would phase in over time.89 
Under a tender, administration costs could be expected to be 
$100 or less per account (Chapter 2), or 20 basis points on a 
$50,000 account.90 Winning funds can be expected to set 
investment fees of about 0.45 per cent for an asset mix that 
includes exposures to unlisted assets similar to today’s system 
(Chapter 3).  
In Super Sting, we estimated that a tender could save up to $2.8 
billion. Our new estimates are lower because  
• Newly published APRA data shows there is $440 billion in 
default products rather than the $550 billion we estimated; 
• Preserving today’s asset allocation, which includes unlisted as 
well as listed products, adds about 0.2 per cent to investment 
costs. 
Public sector funds and large corporate tenders (in which large 
employers tender out their superannuation requirement to funds) 
already attain costs of 0.65 per cent or lower. Savings could be 
greater if the fees for listed asset classes were to approach 
                                            
89 If all default accounts were transferred at once that would be highly disruptive 
to the industry and would violate the choice of account holders. 
90 These current and prospective fees reflect today’s level of inactive accounts,  
which adds about 0.06 percentage points to admin costs per person but reduce 
fees per account by about 0.10-0.15 percentage points. After account 
consolidation, but otherwise at today’s costs, default fees would be about 1.0 per 
cent per year. 
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today’s wholesale fees for passive or rule-based investment 
styles. 
The tender, along with other initiatives, is likely to encourage 
funds to merge, as over time it will reduce inflows to all but the 
most efficient funds.  
6.3 Ensure any efficiency review focuses firstly on what 
affects net returns 
The case for an immediate design and switch to a tender is 
strong. Yet if government decides to adopt the FSI’s 
recommendation and wait to see whether policy changes improve 
efficiency substantially, it should prepare for an efficiency review 
now and run it soon. The review should focus above all on 
whether the system is generating strong net returns for all 
members. The box below shows criteria against which the system 
should be assessed.  
What would an efficient super system look like? 
In an efficient system, the vast majority of default members may 
be served by funds that charge no more than 0.65 per cent and 
probably below 0.5 per cent for administration and investment 
management combined. The vast majority of choice members 
should also be in lean funds.  
Default members would be charged administration costs of well 
under $150 a person and perhaps below $100, regardless of 
account size. Fees should only be charged above that level if 
there is strong evidence of additional value to account holders.  
Default members would be guaranteed that their balances were 
invested in a diverse way across asset classes that are 
appropriate to the account holder’s age. Investment costs could 
be expected to be about 0.45 per cent of total funds invested, or 
less, with appropriate low-cost exposures well below 0.2 per cent 
in listed assets, and some exposure to unlisted assets at a likely 
cost of around one per cent, based on diversification and return 
benefits. These fee benchmarks would only be exceeded when 
supported by evidence of strong returns. Funds would report on 
tax, trade and execution costs and would appropriately balance 
such costs against benefits.  
In an efficient market, investment products that charge higher 
investment fees would not have lower risk-adjusted net-returns.  
Funds should be able to prove they have rigorously applied the 
“scale test”, and acted promptly on their duty to ensure their 
MySuper members are not disadvantaged. They should also be 
able to show that they rigorously assess investment managers, 
with longer-term efficiency the main criterion in each asset class 
and appropriate diversification across asset classes or risk 
factors.  
Across the system, an automated process would minimise the 
number of new surplus accounts generated. There would be 
strong consolidation into the most efficient fund models by greater 
fund consolidation or outsourcing of functions to the most efficient 
administrators. Members who make their own investment choices 
would not end up in products that provide lower net returns at 
higher risk. 
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6.4 Reduce the number of new accounts 
Further steps to reduce the number of excess superannuation 
accounts could save about $30 per account – or $360 million a 
year, about six per cent of the administrative cost base.91  
Government has already taken steps to make it easier to 
consolidate accounts. It now needs to stem the creation of excess 
accounts that occurs when people change jobs. It should ensure 
that existing superannuation account details are automatically 
accessed as part of the standard job induction process. Unless 
individuals explicitly choose to create a new account, they should 
remain with an existing account or consolidate existing accounts 
into the employer-chosen fund. Government should ensure that 
online systems suited to this process are implemented.92  
The ATO holds 4.5 million small accounts on behalf of 
members.93 The number may have been justifiable when 
members could not be identified, but now many such accounts 
are linked to an individual’s tax file number. Sums in such 
accounts should be returned to each member’s active 
superannuation account where possible.  
                                            
91 See Chapter 2 for analysis of the cost savings. The beneficiaries would be 
people with multiple accounts today. 
92ATO (2014). 770,000 of these ATO-held accounts belong to temporary 
residents. 
93 ATO (2015). 
6.5 Consolidate inefficient funds  
Government can do more to facilitate fund mergers. Vigorous 
application by APRA of the MySuper scale test would place 
pressure on funds that cannot show that their small size does not 
disadvantage their members. Yet some funds may remain 
reluctant to merge without a strong shift in the competitive 
environment. Government should therefore not expect these 
measures alone to deliver the full potential for $400 million in 
annual savings outlined in Chapter 2. They are likely to have 
much more impact when combined with the shift in competitive 
focus to net returns that a fee-focused tender for default status 
would provide. 
Tax treatment can reduce the benefits to members of fund 
mergers and so deter funds from merging. Government needs to 
ensure that funds that merge do not disadvantage their members 
by triggering taxes such as capital gains tax when they transfer 
members’ balances.94 The current temporary provisions to 
minimise such tax impediments should be extended indefinitely.95 
Rules on when members can be moved from one product to 
another can also reduce benefits from fund mergers. To cut costs, 
funds need to be able to shift accounts from products and close 
products. Current rules dictate that accounts can only be moved 
to new products if they are judged to be equivalent to the existing 
products.96 Because superannuation products have many subtle 
                                            
94 Tax treatment needs to deal with CGT, 45 day disposal of assets rule and the 
loss of “tax-free component” (ASFA (2014)). 
95 Mercer (2014a). 
96 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth). 
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differences, the test can prevent product closures that would be 
likely to benefit all members. Government should allow funds to 
move accounts as long as they place individuals at “no overall 
disadvantage”, as the 2010 Super System Review (the ‘Cooper 
Review’) recommended. 
6.6 Prior to operating the tender, retain the FWC quality 
screen 
The government has stated that it intends to remove 
superannuation from industrial awards, and so remove any role 
for the Fair Work Commission in superannuation. It should not do 
so unless another quality filter, such as a competitive tender, is in 
operation.  
Each industrial award typically includes a short list of funds that 
employers can select as a default.97 Awards are estimated to 
affect superannuation defaults for 20 to 30 per cent of 
employees.98 Legislation brought in by the previous government 
requires the Fair Work Commission to choose between two and 
15 MySuper products for listing on each award. This process has 
paused, pending appointment of a final representative to the 
Commission’s expert panel responsible for completing the first 
round of product shortlisting.  
Concerns have been raised about the impartiality and expertise of 
the Commission process. Critics argue that it will favour 
                                            
97 There are still many workers who do not have choice of fund. The FSI 
recommended all be given choice of fund. 
98 Productivity Commission (2012) 
incumbent industry funds, will not be effective as a quality filter, 
will be costly to implement, and will add to ongoing costs.99 
Removing defaults from awards without imposing another quality 
filter is unlikely to reduce average default fees and could well 
increase them. It would give employers access to efficient funds 
that are not currently listed on a particular award, and would 
expose some less efficient funds to competition. But these 
benefits can be largely realised with an effective quality filter. And 
removing a quality filter altogether would also increase costs for 
many funds, as they would increase sales, marketing and 
employer retention efforts. Employer search and evaluation costs 
would rise, particularly for smaller firms, and some customers 
would be moved to higher-cost, lower-performing funds due to 
employers making poor choices.100  
It has been argued that APRA could provide a sufficiently rigorous 
screen for quality. Government could direct APRA to apply 
stringent efficiency criteria in screening MySuper products. But 
the current APRA MySuper qualification process is not a sufficient 
quality filter and efficiency has not traditionally been a major part 
of APRA’s mandate. The Productivity Commission observes that 
the “Stronger Super reforms serve largely to standardise features 
and promote disclosure to improve comparability between 
MySuper products, rather than filter out any products which may 
not represent the best interests of employees” and that employers 
                                            
99 FSC (2014). Rafe Consulting (2014), for the FSC, estimated transition costs of 
$265 million, including $185 million due to individuals incurring multiple sets of 
fees and the rest due to the costs of transferring accounts and to employers 
adapting to regulatory change. 
100 Industry Super Australia (2015). Diviny and Smith (2014). 
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are not well-placed to choose from a long list of MySuper 
products. It found there was “a need for a quality filter to 
distinguish among funds seeking listing of their products in 
modern awards.”101 
APRA does require funds to submit information to help it to 
determine whether a fund and its directors are likely to comply 
with their trustee duties. While the requirement serves as a type of 
quality filter, it lets through many MySuper products that appear to 
be inferior. For example, many products offer asset allocations 
that are likely to underperform over the long run, or charge fees 
that are much higher than those of other products with similar 
asset allocations. The new ‘scale test’ for MySuper providers 
could also play a role in screening out poor products, though 
many of them are offered by large funds.  
If the Government accepts claims that the Commission process is 
biased, it could retain the link between awards and default funds, 
but transfer the responsibility for selection of default funds for 
each award to a different body. But this would be inferior to 
running a broader competitive screen for the entire default 
segment, as recommended in this report.  
                                            
101 Productivity Commission (2012). 
6.7 Improve the quality of the choice part of the market  
More can be done to improve the quality of competition in the 
choice segment of the industry. Fees and costs are higher there 
than in defaults.102 While more work is needed to assess how to 
best improve efficiency in the choice segment, three reforms are 
needed in the short term.  
First, government must continue to improve disclosure to make 
products easier to compare. The Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission is working to improve disclosure and 
APRA has significantly upgraded fund reporting. It is essential to 
improve the disclosure of fund performance and costs in 
dashboards, product disclosure statements, account statements, 
and in reporting to APRA. Account holders, employers, funds and 
tender operators must be able to assess superannuation products 
on an objective basis. 
Current disclosure requirements have been criticised for a lack of 
clarity. One submission to the FSI urged regulators to provide 
detailed guidance “outlining the specific manner in which funds 
must disclose fees, whilst ensuring greater transparency via the 
unbundling of separate disclosure of different fee types.”103 In 
particular, funds appear to interpret differently the requirement to 
report a measure of costs called the Indirect Cost Ratio. More 
generally, tax and transaction costs, which can be vital to 
superannuation returns, are not well reported at present.104  
                                            
102Rainmaker Information (2013). 
103 SuperRatings (2014a).  
104 Williams (2014); Norvaca International (2014).  
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Government should also improve MySuper dashboards to remove 
subjective measures such as target returns and emphasise 
objective measures such as asset allocation. Choice product 
disclosure should be aligned to make choice funds directly 
comparable to MySuper products. 
Second, government should vigorously test whether funds and 
financial advisers are complying with their obligations to act in 
their members’ and clients’ interests – by moving clients out of 
high-cost products into more appropriate products, for example. 
Government should remove obstacles to closing high-cost legacy 
products. That would help funds and advisers to act in their 
members’ and clients’ interests. 
Third, upon operating a default tender, government should 
disseminate information about the winners of the tender. They will 
set a tough benchmark for high-cost choice products, and people 
who are in these products should be made aware of the gap 
between the winners and their fund. The Super Sting report 
recommends that government make tax time super choice time – 
in other words, tender winners should be made highly visible to 
taxpayers as they submit tax returns online. Taxpayers should be 
able to compare the winners with their current fund and switch on 
the spot if they wish. Disseminating such information would 
improve the quality of competition across the system. 
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7. Conclusion
Australia’s universal and compulsory system of superannuation 
was introduced in 1992 to ensure that workers provided properly 
for their retirement. As the population ages, compulsory super 
also seeks to take the pressure off Age Pension payments and 
the Commonwealth Budget.  
The system has many strong features. Yet there is strong 
evidence it is not generating value for money for many account 
holders. Current reforms will cut costs significantly but leave 
billions of dollars on the table. 
Administration expenses could be much lower. These expenses 
have no impact on gross investment returns, and so if they 
increase by a dollar, returns are reduced by the same amount, 
leaving members of the more expensive funds poorer in 
retirement as a result. The leanest super funds perform 
administration for a fraction of the cost imposed by many others, 
while often being rated highly for the services they provide.  
Similarly, many of the fees levied for investment management do 
not pay their way. There is strong evidence they could be reduced 
without reducing gross returns.  
The Stronger Super reforms have helped to some extent, and 
have further to run. But even if they achieve their goals they are 
unlikely to reduce fees by much more than 10 per cent. 
Policymakers can do much better. As the FSI review argues, 
policymakers must do more to prune out poor products and, 
unless efficiency improves markedly, create a market mechanism 
to push for strong performance.  
Our 2014 report, Super Sting, argues that further reform of the 
superannuation system in order to reduce fees is long overdue. It 
proposes reforms that have the potential to save billions of dollars 
a year in excessive fees. These reforms would sharpen 
competitive pressure on superannuation fees by making funds 
tender for the right to run a low-cost default fund that all new job 
starters will pay into unless they make other arrangements. A 
second reform will make the system transparent by enabling 
account holders to compare the cost of their fund with the new 
default fund at tax time — and to switch on the spot if they 
choose. 
The reforms will help to address a fundamental threat to the 
adequacy of retirement incomes in Australia. They will reduce 
pressure on the Age Pension and the taxpayer’s dollar. A simpler, 
lower-cost superannuation system will increase the size of the 
economy by freeing up workers, managers, and capital goods to 
produce more value elsewhere. The time to create a more 
efficient and fairer superannuation system is now.  
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